Technology Differences and Capital Flows by Sebastian Claro
Technology Diﬀerences and Capital Flows∗
Sebastian Claro†
Universidad Catolica de Chile
First Draft: March 2004
Abstract
The one-to-one mapping between cross-country diﬀerences in capital returns and the direction of
international capital ﬂows is broken in a multi-sector world where international factor price diﬀerences
are driven by technology diﬀerences. A technology-backward or low-return-to-capital country will face
capital inﬂows or outﬂows after ﬁnancial integration depending on whether no-tradable demand is boosted
or not.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the traditional paradigms in international economics stays that cross-country diﬀerences in per capita
income and wages are determined by international diﬀerences in factor endowments. In particular, poor or
underdeveloped countries are abundant in labor. Therefore, the return to capital is lower in these countries,
and openness to capital ﬂows must generate a ﬂow of capital from rich to poor countries.
This paradigm has been challenged in two dimensions. First, cross-country diﬀerences in factor abun-
dance seen unable to explain international diﬀerences in per capita income. In other words, diﬀerences in
factor endowment must be many times greater than they actually are in order to explain observed diﬀerences
in per capita income across countries (Prescott, 1998; Parente and Prescott, 2002). Also, capital does not
tend to ﬂow from rich to poor countries, as cross-country diﬀerences in capital returns should mandate. This
is not to say that capital does not ﬂow to poor countries, but the vast majority of capital ﬂows occur across
developed countries (with the exception of China in the last years).1 This ”puzzle” lead Lucas (1990) to
search for an answer on why capital does not ﬂow from rich to poor countries.
Both challenges have given rise to a similar answer: international productivity diﬀerences. Cross-
country technology diﬀerences are able to account for diﬀerences in factor returns and per capita income
that diﬀerences in factor endowments cannot account for. Treﬂer (1993) and Hall and Jones (1999) present
direct evidence on this. Also, with international productivity diﬀerences, a country with low wages or low
income per capita may also be a low-return-to-capital country, meaning that capital market integration may
not lead to capital inﬂows in labor-abundant countries.2
International productivity diﬀerences break the link between relative factor endowments and factor prices,
1See Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2003).
2The term international productivity diﬀerences can be interpreted in several ways. It can reﬂect international diﬀerences in
technologies, externalities (Lucas, 1990), institutional factors, or the presence of immobile factors of production. An alternative
explanation is provided by Tornell and Velasco (1992), who argue that if property rights are not well deﬁned, a lower but private
technology for asset accumulation can dominate the high public technology, generating capital ﬂows out of the country with
low protection for property rights.
2meaning that labor-abundant countries may have lower return to capital than capital-abundant countries if
the former are technology-backward. However, technology diﬀerences do not break the one-to-one mapping
between cross-country diﬀerences in capital return and capital ﬂows. Capital market integration make a
high-return-to-capital country a net importer of capital regardless of whether cross-country diﬀerences in
the return to capital are due to diﬀerences in factor endowments or technologies. The converse is also true.
This paper challenges the view that countries with a low return to capital must become net exporters of
capital after capital market integration. I do so by developing a simple multi-sector model with two tradable
goods and a non-tradable product. Factor endowments are such that both tradable goods are produced, and
international factor price diﬀerences follow from technology diﬀerences. Capital market integration leads to
an unambiguous rise in the return to capital in the technology-backward country, a fall in the return to the
internationally immobile factor — labor — and pressures toward specialization in the labor-intensive tradable
sector. The size and direction of capital ﬂows will depend on whether the non-tradable sector expands or
contracts after integration. If capital market integration leads to an expansion of the non-tradable demand
and production, labor market equilibrium conditions are reached with capital outﬂows. However, if non-
tradable demand and production fall, and the fall is big enough, the new equilibrium is reached with capital
inﬂows. This result is relevant for it suggests that explanations for the lack of capital ﬂows toward poor
countries may not be found in diﬀerences in capital returns but rather on the eﬀects of liberalization on
non-tradable demand.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next section presents a very simple one-sector framework
to show the link between cross-country diﬀerences in factor returns and capital ﬂows. Section 3 extends
the analysis to a multi-sector framework. First, I show that the implications of the one-sector model hold
in a framework with many tradable products. The second part shows that the inclusion of a non-tradable
sector changes signiﬁcantly the results, giving rise to a non-monotonic relationship between capital returns
and capital ﬂows. Section 4 concludes.
32 One Sector Model
Consider a small open economy that produces one good labeled x with a constant-returns-to-scale technology
and two internationally-immobile factors of production: labor L and capital K. The product price −
determined in international markets − is px. The equilibrium is characterized by the following two conditions:
px = aLxw + aKxr (1)
aKx
aLx
=
K
L
= k (2)
where aLx is the inverse of average productivity of labor (similar for capital), that depends on the wage-
rental rate ratio w/r. Finally, L and K represent the endowment of labor and capital respectively. Condition
(1) states that product price must equal marginal and average costs. Equation (2) mandates equalization
of relative factor endowments and relative factor usage in industry x. Combining (1) and (2) we can solve
for the equilibrium factor prices w and r as functions of factor endowments consistent with zero-proﬁts and
factor market clearing conditions.
The graphical solution is shown in ﬁgure 1, that depicts a unit value isoquant (1/px) for two countries
that share the same technology. Points v and v∗ represent endowment points of two countries (∗ refers to
a foreign country) that diﬀer only in their factor endowments. In particular, the labor-abundant domestic
country has lower wages and a higher return on capital. This result is obtained analytically by combining
equations (1) and (2) with the deﬁnition of the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital σ,t o
obtain3
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(3)
where r is the (capital market) autarky rate of return on domestic capital and θL is the share of labor in
total output in the domestic economy. According to (3), a labor abundant country (k<k∗)h a sah i g h e r
return to capital (r>r ∗).
[Insert Figure 1]
3σ = b k/(b w − b r) where b k =dk/k.
4Capital market integration equalizes the return to capital in all countries. Assuming an international
return of r∗, this means that labor abundant countries, −with r>r ∗− will face capital inﬂows until the
return to capital is equalized to the international level. Moreover, capital market integration leads to
international wage equalization, even when labor markets remain segmented.
Allowing for international technology diﬀerences −besides diﬀerences in factor endowments− breaks the
link between cross-country diﬀerences in factor abundance and factor returns. Pre-integration diﬀerences
in the return to capital are given by
r∗
r
= −
θL
σ
µ
k∗
k
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¶
+
δ
1+δ
(4)
where δ/(1 + δ) is the Hicks-neutral total factor productivity diﬀerence between domestic and foreign
producers.4 The greater the technology advantage of foreign producers, the greater the diﬀerence in the
return to capital. Similarly for wages. It is evident from (4) that a capital-scarce country can have a
low return to capital if technology is suﬃciently backward. This solution is depicted in ﬁgure 2, where the
domestic return to capital and the wage rate in the capital-scarce country are lower than r∗.
[Insert Figure 2]
In this case, international capital return equalization pushes the domestic (technology-backward) country
toward a more labor-intensive production technique, and the full employment condition implies that capital
outﬂows must take place. Notice that international technology diﬀerences do not break the one-to-one
mapping between rental rate diﬀerences and capital ﬂows, but rather the mapping between cross-country
diﬀerences in factor endowments and relative rental rates.
4Assuming that aLi =( 1+δL)a∗
Lil(ω) and aKi =( 1+δK)a∗
Kik(ω) where l(ω) and k(ω) denote the adjustment in average
productivity due to diﬀerences in relative factor prices ω, the TFP gap between domestic and foreign producers is given by
θLδL/(1 + δL)+θKδK/(1 + δK).F o r δL = δK, this expresion becomes δ/(1 + δ).
53 Multi-Sector Model
3.1 Two Tradable Goods
Consider a small open economy with two tradable industries x and y. Both goods are produced with CRS
Leontief technologies. The ﬁxed-proportions assumption has only second-order eﬀects in the results because
the action in the model is driven by cross-industry mobility of factors. As in section 2, both labor and
capital are internationally-immobile in the pre-integration scenario. For simplicity, assume that x is capital
intensive, so that technology-given factor proportions satisfy kx >k y with k = K/L.
It is natural to assume that factor endowments k are such that both tradable products are produced
(kx > k>k y). Otherwise the one-sector model is relevant, and the Leontief assumption has to be dropped
to allow for factor market clearing. The equilibrium conditions are the following
px = aLxw + aKxr, (5)
py = aLyw + aKyr, (6)
L = Lx + Ly, (7)
K = kxLx + kxLy. (8)
Notice that the ﬁrst two equations uniquely determined the wage and rental rates consistent with zero
proﬁts in both sectors. Similarly, equations (7) and (8) uniquely determine the distribution of labor and
capital across sectors such that market clearing holds.
Technology parameters are such that aLx/a∗
Lx = aKx/a∗
Kx =( 1+δx) ≥ 1, meaning that there are Hicks-
neutral technology diﬀerences between the domestic and foreign producers of x.5 Similarly for y.A s s u m i n g
δx = δy = δ, the pre-integration wages and rental rates are given by6
5All result in the paper hold if factor-saving technology diﬀerences are considered.
6Assuming δx = δy = δ implies international relative factor price equalization. All the results of the model hold with
sector-speciﬁc technology diﬀerences. This assumption is however imposed to assure that technology backward countries have
lower return to both capital and labor.
6w0 =
pya∗
Kx − pxa∗
Ky
(1 + δ)A
(9)
r0 =
pxa∗
Ly − pya∗
Lx
(1 + δ)A
(10)
where A = a∗
Lya∗
Kx − a∗
Kya∗
Lx > 0. Expressions (9) and (10) imply that w∗/w0 = r∗/r0 =( 1+δ).
As in the one-sector model, capital market integration leads to a rise in the domestic return to cap-
ital to r∗, rendering the capital-intensive sector x uncompetitive. The post-integration wage rate w1 =
(py − a∗
Kx(1 + δ)r∗)/a∗
Lx (1 + δ) is unambiguously lower than w0. Specialization in y means that factor
market clearing is reached with capital outﬂows so that b K = 4K/K = ky/k − 1 < 0, reinforcing the result
of the one-sector model.
3.2 Adding a Non-Tradable Sector
Consider that besides sectors x and y there is a non-tradable sector n that produces with a Leontief CRS
technology. Assume also that kx >k y >k n. Equations (5) and (6) determine the pre-integration factor
prices as long as the conditions for positive production of both tradable goods hold. To assure diversiﬁcation
of tradable production we require an explicit analysis of non-tradable equilibrium.
Assuming a simple log-linear utility function of the representative consumer so that non-tradable con-
sumption represents a constant share α of income, the non-tradable market clearing condition can be written
as
α
£
wL + rK
¤
= pncn = wLn + rKn (11)
that implies
α
£
w + rk
¤
=( w + rkn)λn (12)
where λn is the ratio of non-tradable employment to total employment. Equation (11) states that in
equilibrium total expenditure in non-tradable goods has to be equal to the value non-tradable production.
Therefore a pre-integration equilibrium with positive production of x and y exists as long as the value of
7λn(∈ (0,1)) that satisﬁes (12) at factor prices described in (9) and (10) is such that
ky − k
ky − kn
<α γ= λn <
kx − k
kx − kn
< 1 (13)
with
γ =
pa∗
Ly
¡
k − ky
¢
+ a∗
Lx
¡
kx − k
¢
pa∗
Ly (kn − ky)+a∗
Lx (kx − kn)
> 1
and p = px/py. Condition (13) assures that the factor availability for tradable production, after deducting
factor usage in sector n consistent with non-tradable market equilibrium, belongs to (ky,k x). Factor prices
obtained in (9) and (10) pin down a price for the non-tradable good and therefore an optimal level of
consumption −and factor usage− consistent with (12). Factor usage in industry n has to be such that
the remaining factor endowments can be split between both tradable products according to equations (7)
and (8), where L has to be replaced by L − Ln and K by K − Kn. A necessary condition for this is that
kx > k>k n. For the sake of the argument, I assume that domestic country’s factor endowment k is such
that in the pre-integration equilibrium both x and y are produced.
Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium, where I have plotted unit value isoquants for the three sectors. The trace
vv1 measures factor usage in non-tradable production (at pn consistent with w0 and r0). v1 − that measures
factor availability for tradable production− must belong to the cone kykx to assure positive production of x
and y. I have depicted k<k y for expositional simpliﬁcation, but it is possible that tradable diversiﬁcation
takes place if kx > k>k y.
[Insert Figure 3]
What are the eﬀects of international capital market integration? As before, the domestic return to capital
converges to r∗ >r 0, rendering capital-intensive industry x uncompetitive. Therefore, the post-integration
wage rate − obtained using the zero-proﬁt condition for sector y− is given by
w1 =
a∗
Ly
¡
pya∗
Kx − pxa∗
Ky
¢
+ δa∗
Ky
¡
pya∗
Lx − pxa∗
Ly
¢
(1 + δ)Aa∗
Ly
<w 0. (14)
Notice that for δ =0 ,w 1 = w0 = w∗ and r1 = r0 = r∗, revealing that without international technology
diﬀerences there is international factor price equalization before integration, and therefore capital market
8opening does not generate capital ﬂows, regardless of diﬀerences in factor endowments (Mundell, 1957).
The convergence of capital returns to the international level and the corresponding adjustment in domestic
wages generates an unambiguous fall in the price of the non-tradable good. This is because the change in
relative factor prices is determined by factor shares in the labor-intensive tradable industry, that is more
capital-intensive than the non-tradable sector. The eﬀect on non-tradable demand and production will
depend on the impact of relative price changes on nominal income. If k>k y nominal income rises, while
if k<k y nominal income falls. The ﬁnal impact on non-tradable production will depend on whether the
change in pn is higher or lower than the change in nominal income.
At post-integration wage w1 and rental rate r∗, non-tradable factor usage λn1 satisﬁes7
λn1 = απ > αγ = λn0 (15)
revealing that non-tradable consumption, production, and factor usage rise following capital market
integration. The intuition is the following. If k>k y non-tradable supply rises because of the fall in factor
costs while non-tradable demand increases following the rise in nominal income. If k<k y, non-tradable
supply rises but non-tradable demand decreases because nominal income falls. However, the shift in supply
is greater than the shift in demand because k>k n, so the percentage fall in production costs is greater than
the fall in income and demand.
The post-integration equilibrium is unambiguously reached with capital outﬂows. This is evident by
noticing that relative factor availability for production of y after non-tradable factor usage is
¡
k − knλn1
¢
/(1 − λn1) >
ky. But labor market equilibrium requires
³
k
³
1+b K
´
− knλn1
´
/(1 − λn1)=ky,m e a n i n gt h a tb K<0. The
rise in non-tradable factor usage means that relative factor availability for production of y is always more
capital abundant than relative factor requirements in y.I n t e r m s o f ﬁgure 3, the increase in non-tradable
production implies that the factor availability for tradable production is v2. The post-integration equilib-
rium is hence characterized by capital outﬂows of v2y2. Capital outﬂows are accompanied by a depreciation
of the real exchange rate. Are there conditions under which the new equilibrium is reached with capital
7π =
pa∗
Ly(k−ky)+a∗
Lx(kx−k)+δ(ky−k)
³
a∗
Lx−pa∗
Ly
´
pa∗
Ly(kn−ky)+a∗
Lx(kx−kn)+δ(ky−kn)
³
a∗
Lx−pa∗
Ly
´ >γ
9inﬂows? Intuitively, capital inﬂows will take place after capital market integration if the latter is associated
with a big-enough fall in non-tradable demand.
3.2.1 Sticky Non-tradable Prices
If non-tradable production is demand determined, the change in non-tradable production and factor usage is
determined by the change in nominal income that follows from capital market integration. Assuming that
the pre-integration level of pn0 clears the non-tradable market, the post integration level of non-tradable
production is given by8
cn = α
¡
w1L + r∗K
¢
pn0
that implies
λn1 = α
¡
w1 + r∗k
¢
(w0 + r0kn)
. (16)
Plugging (9), (10) and (14) into (16) yields λn1 = ατ, where τ ≶ γ depends on whether k ≶ ky.9 Ap o s t -
integration fall in non-tradable production takes place as long as the country is labor abundant compared to
the factor requirements of industry y (k<k y) At the initial level of pn the fall in nominal income generates
a fall in non-tradable production. Nevertheless, capital inﬂows will take place if
ατ <
ky − k
ky − kn
(17)
that is more likely to hold in technology-backward countries (∂τ/∂δ < 0) and labor-abundant countries
(∂τ/∂k>0 and ∂
£¡
ky − k
¢
/(ky − kn)
¤
/∂k<0). The intuition is straightforward. A technology backward
country faces greater increase in the return to capital following integration, and hence the equilibrium fall
in wages and income is greater. Also, the more labor-abundant a country is the greater the fall income
associated with a fall in the wage-rental rate ratio. In terms of ﬁgure 3, the post-integration factor endowment
for production of y is v3, meaning that capital inﬂows of v3y3 must take place to assure labor market clearing.
8I assume that nominal wages are ﬂexible. This assures that tradable production takes place. Othewise, the zero-proﬁt
condition in y would not hold.
9τ =
a∗
Lx(kx−k)+pa∗
Ly(k−ky)+δ(ky−k)(a∗
Lx−pa∗
Ly)
a∗
Lx(kx−kn)+pa∗
Ly(kn−ky) .
10An important corollary of this result is that the presence of sticky nominal non-tradable prices does not
generate unemployment. Factors released by the fall in non-tradable production −combined with capital
inﬂows− are employed in the tradable sector. Indeed, the size and sign of capital inﬂows are pinned down
by the full-employment condition. Moreover, no depreciation of the real exchange rate takes place following
capital inﬂows.
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